Navigating Aeronautical Safety—Part 2

Unfortunately, the stories like the luck of JAL 907’s pilots are outliers in the quest to preserve lives aloft. Much more often, safety is purchased with the blood from hundreds of broken bodies inside the wrecks of crashed airframes. The Bloody Triumph of Navigation William Langewiesche’s story concerning the origins of CRM misses a huge … Continue reading →

Navigating Aeronautical Safety–Part 1

Three weeks back, I called for the addition of AOA indexers/indicators to commercial airliners and associated training of flight crews to minimize stall risks in the future. Turns out Air France already beat me to the punch: It seems that we are locked into a spiral in which poor human performance begets automation, which worsens … Continue reading →

Aeronautical Common Sense

Three weeks ago, I read to William Langewiesche’s Vanity Fair piece on Air France 447, a crash into the Atlantic Ocean that took the lives of 228 on 1 June 2009; those 228 deaths crying out for a total revamp of air carrier stall recovery procedures: It seems that we are locked into a spiral … Continue reading →

Aggregate Demand Dominance: HCE

In my previous posting, I attempted to knock down one of conservative economics’ sacred cows; today I’m aiming at the crown jewel of conservative canards: personal responsibility. Simply put, market forces don’t care about how responsible individuals are. Health Care Expenditures Health Insurance premiums have been relentlessly escalating for 15 years: No real surprise there. … Continue reading →

Welcome to the Dark Side

For once someone left a comment to a posting I wrote, claiming Dean Baker responded to my musings with “I think he agrees that the NAIRU estimates were grossly off.” Upon reading that, I wanted to whack my head against the nearest solid object at first. When will the economics field recognize the fundamental truths … Continue reading →

Aggregate Demand Dominance: Reaping the Whirlwind

The Utter Failure and Stupidity of the Gold and Silver Standards: Part 9 Once again, I write a posting about the failure of the gold standard without mentioning gold. That was, again, intentional—describing what Nixon’s explicit price controls and the implicit, hidden controls within Bretton Woods’ gold standard were supporting necessitated delving into why 1969 … Continue reading →

Aggregate Demand Dominance: BUFF Barrel Rolls on the Ides of August

NOTE: BUFF is the moniker B-52 crews use to describe the bomber, an acronym for Big Ugly Fat Fucker. The Utter Failure and Stupidity of the Gold and Silver Standards: Part 8 In the previous installment of this series on the collapse of the gold standard, Bretton Woods entered its terminal phase under the onslaught … Continue reading →

Aggregate Demand Dominance: The Arc Lights and the Ides of March

The Utter Failure and Stupidity of the Gold and Silver Standards: Part 7 In the previous installment recounting the train wreck that was the gold and silver standards, I didn’t mention silver or gold at all. There was a reason for that: Stagflation became an untamable wild animal after the second Arab Oil Embargo sent … Continue reading →

Aggregate Demand Dominance: Price Controls’ Nemesis—Oil Embargoes and the Onset of Stagflation

The Utter Failure and Stupidity of the Gold and Silver Standards: Part 6 Stagflation’s onset became apparent after the Arab Oil Embargo. Imposed by OAPEC states that were allied with or were belligerents in a war with Israel, oil prices and inflation soared: The dominant view of scholars and professionals is to consider the 1967 … Continue reading →

Aggregate Demand Dominance: False Foundations

With the Fed continuing to taper (even as inflation keeps coming in below target), I’m reminded how a few days ago Dean Baker once again trotted out a period in history that still befuddles economists of all stripes: This is a great history that should be tattooed on the forehead of everyone involved in the … Continue reading →

Five Years After the Fall: The Atlantic Angle of Attack

I feel a little remiss—I forgot to dig through French investigative propaganda as I did with their NTSB counterparts concerning the 2009 air carrier stall-induced crashes. I had every intention to read through the BEA report on AF 447 thoroughly and report on my findings on the five year anniversary of the A330’s crash this … Continue reading →

What Part of “Lost at Sea” Don’t Investigators Understand?

My feed is clogged with news stories trumpeting that MH370 could/will be found in a matter of days.  The only piece I’ve read that seems reasonable is Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370: Not So Fast — Search Could Take Another Year, Experts Now Say.  I have a question for these “experts:” when do you expect to … Continue reading →

The Procedures Factor

Last February, while delving into the NTSB report on the crash of CO 3407 in Clarence Center, New York (a Colgan Q400 on approach to Buffalo International Airport’s Runway 23 on 12 February 2009), one of this blog’s authors uncovered a shocking misstep on the part of the FAA in 1999 that played a major … Continue reading →

No. This Isn’t a Good Sign…

I have no choice.  I have to pick a bone with Kevin Drum this time: Aside from the fact that we have twelve of these things in just the past 30 years, Waldman points out that Republican names (in bold) are considerably more martial than Democratic names: Even though it’s the military that chooses these … Continue reading →