Adnan Syed’s vacated murder conviction has itself been…vacated: A Maryland appellate court on Tuesday reinstated Adnan Syed’s murder conviction and ordered a new hearing in the case, marking the latest development in the protracted legal odyssey chronicled in the hit podcast “Serial.” Though Syed’s conviction has been reinstated, he will not immediately be taken back … Continue reading
Category Archives: History
Plan Dog To Plan Pulverize
Sorry, again, Drach… …but Command of the Seas in the Second World War would have meant nothing towards victory if the Allies had been saddled with the hapless First World War doctrine that generated Gallipoli and led to Dieppe a generation (27 years specifically) later. We can argue about what Mahan, Corbett and Ellis wrote, … Continue reading
Missing the Marines
Sorry, Drach, but this time your Command of the Seas dreck is simply wrong… …as demonstrated at Dieppe: Despite outnumbering the defenders four-to-one, the Dieppe amphibious landing on 19 August 1942 failed just as hard as Gallipoli a generation earlier, in February 1915. Command of the Seas says little on how effective a naval force … Continue reading
Meditations on Mahan, Kantai Kessen, Command of the Sea, and Julian Corbett
Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1840-1914. Drachinifel has much better things to say about the erstwhile American Admiral than the Imperial Japanese Navy… …principally because of the myriad of myths that surround the concept of commanding the sea (command of the sea, sea control, AirSeaBattle, etc.). Thankfully he isn’t dismissive of Julian Corbett in his subsequent Drydock … Continue reading
In Defense of Kantai Kessen? Really?
No, not really, but some food for thought: We generally refrain from lobbing too much criticism at Drachinifel, as it is his guests such as Justin that really need a fleshing out of his historical knowledge, but here Drachinifel places far too much faith in the idea that longtime prewar doctrine was operative in Imperial … Continue reading
Lives Before Livelihoods
This should go without saying, but lives come before livelihoods. This statement needs to stand on its own, because the press is currently full of crazy statements from American and British talking heads (of all stripes and professions) arguing the economic cost of the current COVID shutdown is too much to bear. On 23 March … Continue reading
77 of 7: The Second of the Five Strikes on Pearl Harbor
At 8 A.M. on Sunday, 7 February 1932, 88 years ago this morning, Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell led the definitive proof that Oahu in general and Pearl Harbor in particular were highly vulnerable to air attack: Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No. 4, January 31–February 12, 1932 Two years in the planning, GJE No. 4 … Continue reading
Definitely Zero, Not Hero: The Marseille Mistake
Justin, Justin, Justin… …before asserting such statistics about and to fighter pilots, perhaps listen to what they actually have to say: Air combat experience going at least back to World War II suggests that surprise in the form of the unseen attacker has been pivotal in three-quarters or more of the kills. In writing about … Continue reading
Return Of The Blitz Effect
On 3 January 2020, the U.S. military launched a fairly provocative action in Iraq: The U.S. assassination of Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard commander and Quds Force leader, will reverberate across the Middle East. Unlike the assassinations of al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden or Islamic State’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who both led spent movements at the … Continue reading
The Ghosts of Horrors Past: Failed Famine or Failure to Feed?
The Famine Factor: War-Winning Strategy or War Crime? From our previous posting, we hinted that the Axis had a worldwide Hunger Plan. Japan, like its German ally, starved occupied peoples to feed its own population: Yet it was not just the Germans who used food as a weapon and tried to deny it to their … Continue reading
The Ghosts of Horrors Past: Hunger Versus War Crimes
When we launched this series more than five years ago on the 72nd anniversary of the Battle of Midway, we had in mind to explore why the Second World War was so devoid of mercy, especially on the side of the Axis Powers. We never explored this directly–the closest we came being a look at … Continue reading
On Midway, Part 6: Heroism vs. Heroes vs Film Heroes.
Our previous postings have been quite laudatory towards the film Dauntless, an indie film from Bayou Pictures about the Battle of Midway mainly due to the fact that the filmmakers had the balls to center their story around a Dauntless crew that gets shot down, survive the water landing but then slowly die over the course of … Continue reading
On Midway, Part 5: The Film Effect
We coined a term, Blitz Effect, in 2016 to describe how strategic bombing of civilians actually tends to INCREASE hostility towards the enemy in war. Now, three and a half years later, we’ve stumbled onto a new effect. There is a definite Film Effect on the U.S. military, most recently demonstrated by Roland Emmerich’s 2019 … Continue reading
On Midway, Part 4: The SBD Dauntless in Film
Having faced the abysmal track record Hollywood has laid out in documenting the Pacific War in the nearly three-quarters of a century since it ended, we turn to factual accuracy in Midway films. The seminal film about the Battle of Midway will one day focus on the SBD Dauntless, the best carrier-based aircraft operational in … Continue reading
On Midway, Part 3: Midway in Film
In our preceding postings in this series, we decried the tendency for American movie-makers to be so submarine-centric that it has warped scholarship on the subject of the Pacific War for 75 years. The first movies made about the Battle of Midway are even worse. Prior to 2019, Hollywood’s best stab at depicting Midway was … Continue reading
On Midway, Part 2: To Tell A Story
In our previous posting, we noted Hollywood’s preference to tell Second World War naval stories through the eyes of submariners, specifically sub skippers. Hollywood during the postwar zenith for WWII films in the 1950s invariably turned to submarine stories, either telling the exploits of Silent Service skippers against the Japanese or getting revenge against German … Continue reading
On Midway, Part 1: Paucity of Pacific Naval Aviation Films
Before delving into the new film Midway, released on Veterans Day 2019 (and doing a deep dive on the actual Battle of Midway from 3-7 June 1942), we need to deal with the paucity of Pacific naval aviation films that have come out of Hollywood since VJ-Day. A clunky title, to be sure, but the … Continue reading
The Ghosts of Horrors Past: The Shift
Midway And The Coming of the Pacific War When it comes to studying the Pacific War from a naval perspective, the popular imagination seems to be captured by three events: Pearl Harbor, Midway, and the three-plus years that occurred after the so-called turning point. This might seem to be a strange choice of topic coming … Continue reading
The Second Offset: An Aside to PSYOPS to SIOP
Before continuing with our series on REFORGER, we first must acknowledge that the precision-guided munitions (PGM) revolution has had an out-sized impact on American war-fighting since the mid-1980s. We first turn to Rebecca Grant in the July 2016 edition of Air Force Magazine: Vast columns of Soviet tanks, troops, jets, and ships haunted American defense … Continue reading
From PSYOPS to SIOP, Part 4: Precision Decision Delusion
From our previous posting, we veered far into Soviet nuclear strategies of the Cold War. This probably seems rather odd considering the focus of this series is on REFORGER, a strictly-conventional NATO war plan to fight Warsaw Pact forces streaming through the Fulda Gap. Why the nuclear detour? Because REFORGER was built on a myth. … Continue reading
From PSYOPS to SIOP, Part 3: Russian Reaction
From our previous posting, we asked what the point of Exercise REFORGER (annually from 1969-1993, reinforcing American and Canadian forces in Europe by air and by sea) was, given the Soviet propensity to favor nuclear war from Khrushchev onward: Although the Soviet Union’s specific war plans, like America’s, remains classified, historians have been able to … Continue reading
From PSYOPS To SIOP, Part 2: Massive Maskirovka To Lessons In Logistics
We left off with the statement that REFORGER (REturn FORces to GERmany), the annual exercise to move American troops from the Continental United States (CONUS) to meet up with their vehicles prepositioned in Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany and the codename for the operation to reinforce NATO forces in Europe after Soviet shells would … Continue reading
From PSYOPS To SIOP, Part 1: Trying Not To Troll
We hesitate to write such a series, which will call in to question one of the responses the excellent naval history Youtube channel Drachinifel gives in his latest Drydock, but he has fallen for a 50-year old maskirovka. We apologize in advance if this appears to be trolling, as this British content producer is normally … Continue reading
77 of 7: The First Sunday the Seventh Attack
Just after dawn on Sunday the Seventh, the airborne attackers rolled in from the north, using weather skillfully to surprise the pursuit squadrons napping at Luke and Wheeler Fields on Oahu. Proceeding to Pearl Harbor, the planes struck Battleship Row with sacks of white flour….wait, what? Since 1923, the U.S. Navy had conducted large-scale naval … Continue reading
Hitler’s Achilles Heel
The Imperator Knight, keeper of the Youtube history channel TIK, makes a splashy statement: Titling this entry “The MAIN Reason Why Germany Lost WW2 – OIL” naturally opens TIK’s assertion to Al Murray’s retort, “No, it’s much more complicated than that;” except 1940s realities do not support TIK’s theory: By January German rail traffic had … Continue reading
Soviet Showa POWs
My Second World War focus has for decades been squarely focused on the Pacific, for a variety of reasons. My forefathers fought the Japanese in that huge expanse, and a long-time interest in naval aviation draws one to the sea battles that raged there. However, the chief reason was how awful the worst part of … Continue reading
The Ghosts of Horrors Past: From Forager/Slaughter by the Sea
In continuing to write about the Pacific War in general and Midway more specifically, this series has overlooked the central story. Write a seminal piece about the Battle of Saipan, but only briefly touch on the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot doesn’t have the same attraction as the David versus … Continue reading
The Ghosts of Horrors Past: Back To the Beginning
Justin and MHV put together an excellent video on the hopelessness of the Japanese amphibious assault planned for June, 1942. Finally, they come to understand the war in Pacific, right? I began writing a series on the Pacific three and a half years ago, intending to focus on the unexplored horrors faced by the victims … Continue reading
Blockade Economics, Part 2
Roosevelt’s Embargo Often overlooked in Dönitz’s sniveling complaints that the Americans went to war against the Axis before Hitler’s declaration of war… OUR DECLARATION of war against the United States on December 11, 1941, created an entirely new situation in the American waters of the Atlantic. Not that we had been at peace with the … Continue reading
Blockade Economics, Part 1
At the risk of turning into another Ahab ourselves, once more we must follow Karl Dönitz down with his obsession to slay the British Great White Whale–its convoy system: In the First World War the German U-boat arm achieved great successes; but the introduction of the convoy system in 1917 robbed it of its opportunity … Continue reading
300: From Triumph To Tirpitz’s Terribleness To Dönitz’s White Whale
From our previous posting, we ended with a particularly provocative statement. To reiterate: Dönitz’s downfall took down the entire German state with him, and could probably be summed up in one word–arrogance. At the risk of sounding arrogant ourselves, we postulate that the historical reality of complete failure was the only possible outcome to the … Continue reading
300/Hedgehog, Part 7
We would prefer to dispense with a dumbass like Karl Dönitz, who was such a hedgehog he doesn’t deserve the reputation he still has nearly 37 years after his death. He was the chief architect of German naval strategy during the Second World War, but that doesn’t indicate anything other than the fact that his … Continue reading
Endgame-3/Hedgehog, Part 6
The Enigma of February 1945 As Germany was crumbling, what was the Kriegsmarine really facing? Were the German submariners about to unleash Hell… The number of U-boats sunk monthly reached a low for this period as only six U-boats were sunk during January, one in the Pacific and five in the Atlantic. All of these … Continue reading
Endgame-2/Hedgehog, Part 5
In our previous posting, we attacked the concept both of Germany’s World War II Wunderwaffe and the idea that the Type XXI could have won the war if the Kriegsmarine had them earlier. This leads to a question–where did the idea that the Type XXI was a Wunderwaffe come from? GUPPYing it Up For once, … Continue reading
Endgame-1/Hedgehog, part 4
We’ve detoured from our regularly-scheduled program, the series On Naval Strategy, to deal with the enigma of Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz. The Kriegsmarne clearly failed in its mission, its surface ships being utterly annihilated by the one-two punch of the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. But Dönitz had over 450 submarines in commission on … Continue reading
Hedgehog, Part 3
Hedgehog meets MMMMMMQ meets Dipshit Dönitz. At least his training regime for his men made sense, right? Men On first glance, sure: As to the training of this first U-boat flotilla we had possessed since 1918, I had received neither orders, instructions or guidance. That was all to the good and I was very glad. … Continue reading
Hedgehog, Part 2
In our previous posting, we described Karl Dönitz as a hedgehog, in the vein of the Greek poet Archilochus or the philosopher Isaiah Berlin. We also began to MMMMMMQ him, declaring that from the viewpoint and fact that he was deservedly convicted as a major war criminal, that unreformed Nazi and Hitler fanboy isn’t much … Continue reading
Hedgehog, Part 1
In passing we described Karl Dönitz as a hedgehog in the previous posting. Before continuing this series on naval strategy, we should explain what this meant. Archilochus described the world as being divided into two groups of people–foxes that know lots of things, and hedgehogs that know one big thing. This was adapted further by … Continue reading
Killing the Kriegsmarine/MMMMMMQ-2/On Naval Strategy Part 18
We hate to jump to the end of the story, even if the events occurred over 70 years ago, but the answer to this question must jump to the forefront–when and why did the Kriegsmarine lose the Battle of the Atlantic? The when is relatively easy to pinpoint–May 1943. That month the Germans lost 41 … Continue reading
MMMMMMQ-1/On Naval Strategy, Part 17
Continuing from our previous posting, we answer ‘at what point in the war did Dönitz finally fail his men?’ The answer, strangely, was in 1918. Dönitz came up with a submarine strategy for the Second World War based on learning the wrong lessons from failing in the First World War. Man, Men, Machines, Material and … Continue reading
On Naval Strategy, Part 16
From having written 15 previous installments that vociferously argue against the idea that naval strategy is build strategy, we will take a new tack and give MHV’s assertion the benefit of the doubt: After all, there is a kernel of truth to MHV’s pronouncement. Simply put, there is no question that the output of American … Continue reading
On Naval Strategy, Part 15
The T2 Tanker program sealed Germany’s fate, chiefly because the Nazis were already past the point of no return by New Year’s day 1942: As a highly developed industrial state, Germany was dependent even in peacetime on external sources for an adequate supply of oil. Even though Germany’s 1938 oil consumption of little more than … Continue reading
On Naval Strategy, Part 14
From our previous posting, we explored the conundrum facing the Kriegsmarine’s top two admirals. For the opening salvo for Operation Neuland, should Donitz dispatch five U-boats to tear up the refineries, or sink the tankers? The importance of Aruba, its refineries, and the lake tankers were not lost on the Germans. Donitz wanted his U-boats to make … Continue reading
On Naval Strategy, Part 13
Oil and Gas There was one item Britain needed to import, however–petroleum. Britain was a coal powerhouse during both World Wars, so there never was a danger of the lights blinking out for lack of fuel for coal-fired power plants, its people freezing like the Germans did on the Continent starting in 1916 or its … Continue reading
On Naval Strategy, Part 12
Merchant Raiding Myths Continuing from our previous posting, the German Navy had significantly greater problems than just ‘naval strategy is build strategy.‘ We really harp on MHV, but the Kriegsmarine’s issues did not start or end with the failure to implement Plan Z over Grand Admiral Erich Raeder’s ten-year timetable. Its very strategic focus was … Continue reading
On Naval Strategy, Part 11
Before turning to the Kriegsmarine in general and back to MHV’s statement that “naval strategy is build strategy” in regards to Plan Z, we ask another question: Q—What was the most successful submarine attack in history? A—the sinking of ARA General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror on 2 May 1982. Belgrano’s loss also cemented the Argentine … Continue reading
On Naval Strategy, Part 10
In the last posting, we went back to the Battle of the Falkland Islands, a naval clash on 8 December 1914. It didn’t turn out well for the Germans: A month after German naval forces led by Admiral Maximilian von Spee inflicted the Royal Navy’s first defeat in a century by sinking two British cruisers … Continue reading
On Naval Strategy, Part 9
An astute reader by this point in our series on naval strategy will notice an omission. We have focused very narrowly on modern, nuclear navies to describe maritime missions while ignoring the most violent episodes in World history. The Second World War in the Atlantic (including the Mediterranean Sea), Arctic, Indian and Pacific Oceans slaughtered … Continue reading
On Naval Strategy, Part 8
0B Only From the posting yesterday, it should be clear the Royal Navy was on a path to becoming an all-nuclear force after acquiring UGM-27 Polaris SLBMs, but not in the way one might expect. The logical outgrowth of the rot injected into the MOD by Duncan Sandys in 1957 would have scrapped the entire surface fleet … Continue reading
Aviation / Current / History / Uncategorized / Warfare
On Naval Strategy, Part 7
(continued from yesterday) The New Mission—RAF 0A to British 0B The Suez Crisis also featured the combat debut of the V-Bombers: On the evening of October 31, Royal Air Force (RAF) English Electric Canberra and Vickers Valiant bombers from Cyprus and Malta dropped explosives on Egyptian airfields. The Halloween raid shocked Nasser into ordering his … Continue reading
In The Corner, Mumbling and Drooling 